
The appellant was deemed responsible of organizing the travel of at least two women from El Salvador towards the United States, where they aimed to enter illegally. One of the migrants-to-be declared that she had paid to a middle man, though the person in charge of the trip was the appellant. The other migrant-to-be stated the middle man had come to her residence in company of a person named O. (first name of the appellant), who would be responsible for the smuggling venture and with whom she initiated the trip the day agreed upon.
The identification of the appellant by the witnesses was made through the former’s I.D. document.
In ascertaining the facts, authorities relied much on testimonial evidence (including from police officers involved in the investigation and the migrants-to-be) and the outcome of searches and seizures.
Legal findings
The First Magistrate’s Court of Juzgado de Paz) of Ahuachapán (El Salvador) determined the remand in custody of the appellant as it considered (i) the latter to be likely responsible for a crime of migrant smuggling, and (ii) that by allowing him to await trial in freedom would jeopardise investigations. On appeal, the Supreme Court revoked such measure.
For further details see “Procedural History” and “Commentary”.
On 3 December 2014, the First Magistrat’s Court (Juzgado de Paz) of Ahuachapán (El Salvador) determined the precautionary detention of the appellant. In so ruling, the Juzgado de Paz considered the evidence available sustained the likeliness of the appellant being responsible for a crime of migrant smuggling. In addition, it was of the opinion that by allowing the appellant to await trial in freedom, the risk would arise of him evading justice and or tampering with evidence and thus affecting the course of investigations. The Juzgado de Paz noted that the appellant was allegedly involved in assisting people to evade authorities. Furthermore, the high penalty associated to the crime-type in question would motivate him to run away from justice.
It followed the appeal herein under analysis.On appeal, the Defence argued:
The Supreme Court noted as follows:
Against this background, the Cámara de la Tercera Sección de Occidente(Supreme Court of Justice)considered, in view of the specific circumstances of the case, it would be too onerous to impose custody in remand. Rather, alternative measures were to be applied that would still ensure the efficacy of investigations, e.g. prohibition of leaving the country, prohibition of communicating with the witnesses, obligation to appear before the Investigative Judge every 15 days, bail of 14 000 USD to be paid before release of the appellant.