During 2004/2005 the United Kingdom experienced a massive increase in the availability of Class A Drugs (primarily cocaine) at street level. This increase however, was proportionally inverse to the purity of the drugs and forensic examination identified that the drugs had been cut with pharmaceutical chemicals primarily but not exclusively Benzocaine and Lidocaine.

Benzocaine and Lidocaine have a number of legitimate uses in the human and animal medicine field and some minor applications in the manufacturing of plastics.

The use of the two substances was viewed as a new trend and the benefits of there use was explained by a number of experts. The chemicals in question are both mild anaesthetics and when mixed with the controlled drugs gave a similar numbing effect. In addition, the substances were both members of the “caine” chemical family and would mimic each other when subjected to the process of preparing crack cocaine from cocaine. This process requires the drug to be heated, burning off the impurities and making the substance more potent. If a drug dealer were to buy a kilo of cocaine cut for example with fifty percent glucose then the heating process would burn away the glucose leaving the dealer with only half a kilo of crack. The same kilo cut with Bezocaine or Lidocaine would not reduce in volume and subsequently the profits available by cutting the cocaine with the chemicals mentioned would greatly increase.

The United Kingdom threat assessment for cocaine importation is set at forty tonnes per year at eighty percent ( 80%) purity at the point of importation. Street seizures during the period of the investigation revealed purity to be as low as ten percent (10%). It is believed that the chemicals imported by the OCG had potentially doubled the amount of cocaine available to the end user.

In response to the threat various UK law enforcement agencies seized chemicals and made a number of arrests of persons involved in the importation/distribution of the chemicals. The possession and onward supply of these cutting agents is not in itself a criminal offence and it was quickly established that bringing charges and a successful prosecution against those involved would be extremely difficult.

Advice from the Crown Prosecution Service was that any realistic chance of prosecution would have to establish that those involved had the requisite knowledge and intent from the outset to supply the chemicals to drug dealers.

The OCG comprised of the three main individuals, however, over 30 individuals were arrested in connection with this enquiry, all involved to a lesser degree with transport and money laundering. There were twenty-two separate UK linked seizures of drugs, cash and firearms the majority of which lead to prosecutions made by SOCA and its law enforcement partners. The three named individuals were jointly engaged in the importation of chemicals being used to adulterate and bulk significant quantities of controlled drugs. It has been established that between 2005 and 2008 these three men imported approximately forty tonnes of chemical cutting agents. The Home Office Forensic Science Service estimated a realisation value to the United Kingdom illicit drugs trade of between 3.5 and 14 billion pounds.

Greaves was instrumental in arranging money transfers in excess of £100,000 from his vehicle sales company to legitimate importers of chemicals. He then falsified his accounts to hide these transactions.

Commencement of the Investigation

In November 2006 Dorset Police searched a premise in the Bournemouth area and recovered significant quantities of cocaine with a street value of 1.5 million pounds and cash totalling 1.7 million pounds. The drugs were found to be at various stages of adulteration. Also recovered were a number of barrels of the chemical Lidocaine and it was established that the premises were being used on an industrial scale to cut/mix cocaine.

From markings on the barrels a legitimate supplier was identified in the Brighton area who when visited stated he had supplied the chemicals to an Andrew BLOMLEY who he believed had a chain of chemist shops in the North West of the UK. It was apparent that he had supplied these and other barrels of chemicals to BLOMLEY and was currently in the process of delivering a further shipment of sixty drums each weighing ( 25 kgs ) twenty five kilos (total 1.5 tonnes ) It was quickly established that BLOMLEY was a false identity giving sufficient grounds to instigate further enquiries.

Due to geographical nature of the enquiry primacy of the investigation went to the Serious Organised Crime Agency and was given the name Operation JUNKO. This Operation was also, to link with Project Kitley within SOCA. The initial objectives being

1. Identify the OCG’s importing or using such chemicals, the structure and logistics of their criminal business and also the full nature and scale of the criminality.

2. Ensure the effective co-ordination of collaborative working arrangements and engagement of relevant partners in the UK and abroad based on shared knowledge, common interest and mutual support.

3. Build knowledge of the finances of these OCG’s, including the identification of assets, accounts and use of criminal profits as well as money laundering methods and use of specialists and thereby:-

a. Inform Project Kitley with a clear picture of the scale of cutting agents use in the illegal supply of class A drugs in the UK, including an understanding of the finances involved.

b. Identify a number of OCG’s and disrupt or dismantle them by operational activity.

c. Reduce the amount of such chemicals available for sale to individuals in the UK

d. Conduct an intelligence assessment examining the acquisition, importation and use of cutting agents.

e. Conduct a systematic forensic analysis of seized class A samples to identify cutting agents.

f. Seek opportunities for operational deployment by SOCA or partner agencies with a view to disrupting or dismantling OCG’s engaged in this trade.

g. Seize class A drugs and consignments of cutting agents

h. Seize criminal assets.

Some of these objectives were subsequently altered or prioritised differently due to ethical and legal implications the main ones being:-

The decision to allow cutting agents to run on potentially into the hands of drug dealer and down the supply chain to the public.

The importation of such chemicals was not in itself illegal.

Advice was immediately sought from the Crown Prosecution Service and a Senior Advocate was allocated to the investigation. From the outset there was close liaison between the case team and CPS,

Initially a controlled delivery was made to the OCG in the North of the UK and the composition of this organisation slowly established utilising conventional surveillance, telecommunications analysis and financial analysis. A forensic and technical strategy was also developed whereby any consignment which was identified as destined for this OCG would be uniquely marked and on occasions technical equipment deployed.

The forensic marker would allow all individual barrels found later at the site of drugs seizures to be identified as those supplied by the OCG and thus establishing the breadth and scale of the operation.

The deployment of technical equipment would assist in finding such sites and establishing that these random barrels were only ever destined for illicit purposes and thus there was never any intention to supply these chemicals to licit users. These sites or cutting houses were often found during the course of normal law enforcement activity and linked back to the SOCA enquiry after intelligence dissemination and educational inputs to such organisations.

This strategy subsequently identified 22 such seizures throughout England and Scotland often accompanied with cash and firearms.

It was hoped that this evidence could then be turned against the OCG to secure a conviction.

Surveillance surrounding the delivery of the barrels identified BLOMLEY as Jamie Stephen DALE who operated a business making diesel from waste oil products, none of the chemicals subject to the enquiry are used in this process.

It also identified two further males having access to the barrels of chemicals.

John CAWLEY was seen on a number of occasions moving and delivering barrels. It was also later proven that he was involved in depositing cash payments and obtaining storage space using false details.

Barry HARTLEY, who has previous drugs convictions, was seen in possession of the barrels and in meetings with other known drug dealers.

Account monitoring orders were placed on these individuals and their businesses. On occasions cash deposited by them was seized and forensically examined. This determined that the large quantities of cash were originating with sources involved in the drugs trade due to the significantly high traces of controlled drugs found on the notes. This type of monitoring also assisted in establishing the impending dates of chemical importations together with their value, method of payment and source.

To support the investigation a number of expert witnesses were identified who provided the knowledge surrounding the illegitimate and the legitimate uses of the chemicals, among those used were experts in forensic toxicology, medicine, dental anaesthetics, veterinary health, fish farming, plastics manufacturing and bio diesel production. In addition to these an expert in chemical engineering was tasked with providing a report on the overall manufacture and consumption of the said chemicals.

The findings of this report indicated that the amount of chemicals imported by this OCG represented twenty percent of the global production over the period of the conspiracy. Furthermore, the Forensic Science Service used the data they held on the national trends of drug seizures to estimate that the realisation value of the chemicals imported by DALE would generate a profit at street level between 3.5 and 14 billion pounds.

Analysis of telecommunications data, although time consuming, proved essential in provenancing the fact that DALE was using false identities and established numerous opportunities to gather supporting evidence of his connections and influence.

DALE, the head of the OCG, had no previous convictions and so a bad character officer was appointed to establish evidence of misconduct of the OCG and those individuals they were observed to meet with. This built up a formidable picture of a cutting agent OCG holding regular meetings with known and convicted drug suppliers.

In excess of three thousand witness statements were obtained to both support evidence of the importation and distribution of the chemicals and negate any potential defences of legitimacy that might be proffered by the OCG.

Based upon all the evidence including the seizures, expert witnesses, financial irregularities, false

identities and the bad character of individuals linked to the investigation a comprehensive advice file

was submitted to the Crown Prosecution Service.

The reviewing lawyer from Crown Prosecution Service supported the findings of the advice file and agreed that the investigation had sufficient grounds to arrest and interview those involved.

In July 2008 SOCA officers assisted by over two hundred police officers from across the region arrested DALE, HARTLEY, CAWLEY together with more than a dozen others and search warrants were executed at multiple premises.

During the searches large quantities of cash were recovered along with mobile telephones, computers, electronic storage devices and documentation.

DALE disputed his involvement with drug dealers and stated he was a legitimate business man, he denied using or being connected to any of the false identities.

John CAWLEY made no reply throughout his interviews.

Barry HARTLEY also disputed his involvement in criminality stating he used the chemicals to medicate his show jumping horses (this being rebutted by the equestrian veterinary expert) Examination of the seized cash identified it to be heavily contaminated with controlled drugs and evidence gleaned from mobile phones and computers further pointed to DALE being BLOMLEY.

The Crown Prosecution gave a positive decision to charge the three based upon the following.

The sheer amount of chemicals being imported by the OCG. (20% of the global production.)

The lack of any business records or legitimate customers for the chemicals in question.

The twenty two linked seizures of drugs, cash and firearms and a number of ancillary prosecutions by SOCA and our law enforcement partners.

Telephone evidence connecting one or all three of the suspects with the above drug dealers.

The expert evidence of the legitimate and illegitimate uses of the chemicals

The cash rich lifestyle enjoyed by the three including expensive jewellery, properties, holidays and vehicles.

Money recovered from the suspects being heavily contaminated with controlled drugs.

The previous bad character of HARTLEY and the third party bad character of the people who he met.

Evidence of surveillance officers who overheard snippets of conversation relating to drugs.

The staggering realisation value of several billion pounds set by the FSS.

Much of the above evidence was circumstantial when looked at in isolation however, when considered collectively it clearly demonstrated the guilty knowledge and intent required to support a successful prosecution.

Based on the types of drugs recovered at the different seizures all three were charged with conspiracy to supply class A and class B drugs under section ( 4 ) of The Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 and section 1( 1) of the Criminal Law Act 1977.

The final prosecution file was paginated at over ten thousand pages and in excess of thirty thousand items of unused material had to be considered and categorised.