At approximately 6:00 p.m. on June 1, 2004, United States Border Patrol agents stopped a vehicle on Interstate 8 in eastern San Diego County, California, that contained a driver, Angelica Lopez, and 12 passengers. After questioning the passengers, the agents arrested Lopez and brought her, along with the others, to a Border Patrol station roughly 10 miles away.
Border Patrol Agent Eric Huber and his partner observed Lopez's vehicle, a white Ford Expedition, enter the freeway from Buckman Springs Road. According to Huber, the Expedition bounced in a distinctive fashion that suggested that it might be carrying an unusually heavy load. The agents pulled their patrol van alongside Lopez's vehicle and Huber peered inside. He observed what he believed to be several persons lying on the floor in the back of the SUV. Huber testified that at that point Lopez slowed her vehicle drastically. The agents ran its license plates and determined that it was registered to “Angelica Lopez.” The agents then activated their emergency lights and effected the stop.
Huber testified at length about statements Lopez allegedly made to him at the Border Patrol station. According to Huber, Lopez told him that earlier that day she had spoken by telephone with an individual named “Jose,” and had made arrangements with him to pick up the persons later found in the Expedition. Lopez also gave Huber a vague physical description of Jose. Jose had instructed Lopez, Huber testified, to drive to the area where the agents first observed her, where she would find a sweater in the road; the sweater would mark the meeting place where Lopez would meet her passengers. She was then to transport them to a gas station in El Centro, where she would be paid $500. Huber testified that Lopez told him that she believed that her passengers were in the country illegally, and that he verified that none of the passengers was in fact legally present in the United States.
- O.B testified that she is a Guatemalan citizen who did not have documentation permitting her to enter the United States. She explained that she and [her husband, M.O traveled to Tijuana, Mexico, where they made arrangements to be taken to Los Angeles for $1,500 each. The couple took a bus to Tecate, Mexico, from which point a guide walked them, along with 18 other persons, through the hills and into the United States, a journey that lasted two days and nights. The guide left the group in the hills with instructions to wait until someone came to pick them up. A vehicle came shortly thereafter, but it was stopped by immigration officials, who also seized eight individuals from O.B and M.O’s group. The remaining 12, including the couple, stayed hidden in the hills. Around this time, O.B began to menstruate and blood became visible on the outside of her pants. The following day the entire group, concerned for O.B's health, moved from the hills to the road to seek assistance. According to O.B, all 12 individuals were visible from the road at this point. About an hour after they moved to the roadside-and a total of one night and one day after the guide had left them in the hills-O.B and the 11 others were picked up by Lopez. M.O, who took the stand after O.B, gave testimony consistent with his wife's. He added that Lopez had told the passengers “to tell the truth if she was stopped, or if she was apprehended,” and that she had told them all “to duck.”
- M.V stated that [he] is a Guatemalan citizen without documentation to enter the United States. His account of the events surrounding the June 1 incident was consistent with O.B and M.O's and included similar details. According to M.V, when the individuals climbed into Lopez's vehicle, she told them, “Just get in there and make yourselves comfortable so that all of you can fit in.” Some time later she added, “Don't blame me if we're stopped.”
- Lopez explained how she acquired the Expedition she was driving on June 1. She testified that some time earlier she saw the vehicle sporting a “for sale” sign in a restaurant parking lot and that she called the owner from a public phone. When she followed up on May 28, the owner informed her that the car had been moved to an impound lot in San Diego County. Lopez tendered payment and she and the owner registered the vehicle in her name that day.
On June 1, according to Lopez, a friend gave her a ride to the impound lot, two and a half hours from Pomona, to retrieve the car. The vehicle had no fuel, so Lopez stopped at a gas station before heading back toward the freeway. She became lost, however, as she had on her way to the impound lot as well. Lopez mistakenly entered the eastbound side of the highway. There, she saw two men on the side of road, waving “like they looked desperate, like they needed help.” As she drove closer, she saw a woman with blood on her pants. Lopez testified that she had offered roadside assistance to strangers in the past, and that she stopped to do so on June 1. She said that the bleeding woman's husband told her that his wife needed help because she was “hemorrhaging.” Lopez volunteered to take the husband and wife “to the nearest place so they can get help for her”; when the couple got into Lopez's car, however, the other 10 individuals from the group followed. Lopez testified that she was not concerned with the passengers' immigration status because she was concerned about helping the bleeding woman-as Lopez put it, “you don't ask somebody for documents when you are helping them.” Lopez drove for about 10 minutes before the Border Patrol pulled her over. She denied braking when the Border Patrol vehicle pulled up alongside her.
The agent who stopped Lopez took her keys and began speaking to the passengers; because she was “told to be quiet,” Lopez had no chance to explain to him about the bleeding woman until much later, when she was in custody at the Border Patrol station. Lopez denied telling Huber the “Jose” story and denied making the statements in the vehicle that M.O and M.V attributed to her. Lopez also called as a witness her sister, who testified that Lopez had lent roadside assistance to strangers in the past.In court, Border Patrol Agent Eric Huber testified, giving his account of the events of June 1, of the arrest and indictment that followed. The government also called as material witnesses two of the passengers named in A.L.’s indictment, O.B, and her husband, M.O, and allowed for deposition testimony of M.V, a third material witness named in the indictment.
The district court denied Defendant A.L.’s motion for acquittal at the close of the government’s case, and Defendant A.L. took the stand and testified on her own behalf. Defendant A.L. testified that after purchasing the “Expedition” vehicle on May 28, she had entered the freeway heading the wrong direction, at which point she saw two men on the side of the road waving “like they looked desperate, like they needed help.” The Defendant offered to take the husband and wife (O.B and M.O) to get help, and the other 10 individuals followed.
Defendant A.L.’s sister also testified as a witness.
At the end of the testimony, Defendant A.L. renewed her motion for acquittal, which the district court again denied.
The jury convicted Defendant A.L. on all six counts, after which A.L. filed post-trial motions for a judgment of acquittal and a new trial. The district court denied these motions after a hearing, and sentenced A.L. to a mandatory term of five years in prison, to be followed by two years of supervised release.Defendant A.L. appeals against the decision of the District Court, challenging inter alia the sufficiency of the evidence to support her convictions for the three “brings to” offenses.
The Court of Appeals accepted the government’s version of the facts presented in the initial trial as correct because Defendant A.L. was originally convicted on all counts.
The Court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to establish that the defendant aided and abetted the initial transportation into the country, and reversed the convictions on the “bringing to” offense. According to the Court, it is undisputed that the Defendant encountered the aliens and provided them with transportation after they had been dropped off in the United States. Thus, her act of transporting the aliens occurred only after the “brings to” offense had terminated and cannot, standing alone, serve as a basis for sustaining her conviction for aiding and abetting that “bringing to” offense.
O.B testified that she is a Guatemalan citizen without proper documentation to enter the United States, and that she and M.O had traveled to Tijuana, Mexico, where they made arrangements to be taken to Los Angeles for $1,500 each. The couple took a bus to Tecate, Mexico, from which point a guide walked them and 18 others into the United States, over two days and nights. The guide left the group in the hills, after which a vehicle came and picked them up, but was stopped by immigration officials who arrested 8 individuals. The remaining 12 hid in the hills, at which point O.B began to menstruate, and the group moved to the road to seek assistance. M.O testified consistently with O.B, and added that Defendant A.L. had told the passengers to “tell the truth if she was stopped, or if she was apprehended.”
M.V, a Guatemalan citizen without documentation to enter the United States, whose testimony was consistent with O.B’s and M.O’s, was not present at A.L.’s trial.
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
In 8 U.S.C. § 1324, Congress created several discrete immigration offenses, including (1) bringing an alien to the United States; (2) transporting or moving an illegal alien within the United States; (3) harbouring or concealing an illegal alien within the United States; and (4) encouraging or inducing an illegal alien to enter the United States. The Court of Appeals considers the first offense, establishing criminal liability for “[a]ny person who, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has not received prior official authorization to come to, enter, or reside in the United States, brings to… the United States in any manner whatsoever, such alien.”
The major question at hand is whether an individual who transports illegal aliens within the United States from a drop-off point to another destination, without crossing national borders, is guilty of the offense of aiding and abetting the crime of “bringing” the aliens “to” the United States (8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2); 18 U.S.C. § 2), in addition to the offense of transporting aliens “within” the United States (8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii)). The answer depends on the point at which the crime of “bringing to” terminates. The court held that the elements of the “bringing to” offense are satisfied once the aliens cross the border, and the offense continues until the initial transporter drops off the aliens on the U.S. side of the border.
The court also overruled any of their prior decisions that adopt or suggest a different rule, in particular, the “immediate destination” (ultimate destination) test set forth in United States v. Ramirez-Martinez, 273 F.3d at 912.
The government argues that a “brings to” offense that commences outside the United States does not terminate until the aliens reach their “immediate destination” in the United States, which in this case, was Los Angeles.
The government also argues that even if the “brings to” offense terminates at some earlier point, aiding and abetting liability was established by its showing that prior to the termination of the offense the defendant acted in a fashion that enabled or encouraged others to commit that offense.
The Court of Appeals concluded that the governments arguments are unsustainable, and rejected the government’s first theory as a matter of law, and the second as a matter of fact.
In considering the “brings to” offense under § 1324(a)(2), the Court considered a plausible reading, to conclude that the “brings to” offense terminates at the point which the alien reaches or crosses the border, consistent with past reasoning that “[a] crime is complete when each element of the crime has occurred.” United States v. Smith, 740 F.2d 734, 736 (9th Cir. 1984).
On a plain reading of the statutory language, a person who moves aliens from one location in the United States to another has not brought those aliens “to” the United States, has not acted extraterritorially, and has not committed a “brings to” offense. The offender has acted entirely on domestic soil and has committed only a “transports within” offense. Furthermore, Congress’ distinction between those two offenses and the punishments that attach to each “reflects the different dangers which the two crimes pose.”
Interestingly, the Court concluded that for venue purposes under 18 U.S.C. § 3237, the “brings to” offense is a continuing offense after entry and does not terminate merely because all of the elements are met, for four reasons. Nevertheless, the Court’s understanding of § 1324(a)(2) as a continuing offense for venue purposes does not compel them to reach the conclusion that the “brings to” offense continues until the aliens reach their ultimate destination, it means merely that the venue lies in any district touched by the crime before the crime is completed.
Regarding the government’s theory of aiding and abetting liability under 18 U.S.C. § 2, a person “who aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures” the commission of an offense against the United States is “punishable as a principal.” The Court found that the mere act of picking up aliens and transporting them within the United States is not sufficient to support a conviction for aiding and abetting a “brings to” offense under 18 U.S.C. § 2. The evidence is not sufficient to establish the intent necessary to prove aiding and abetting.