Liu challenged his convictions on the grounds that the district court’s evidentiary rulings had created a reversible error.

Both defendants were convicted in district court and both challenged their convictions. Zheng challenged her convictions on the grounds that (1) the court lacked jurisdiction to prosecute her; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions; (3) the district court’s evidentiary rulings created reversible error; (4) there was prosecutorial  misconduct; and (5) the court failed to properly instruct the jury.  In addition, Zeng challenged her sentence, arguing that (1) the sentencing guideline calculation was incorrect and (2) restitution was improper or was incorrectly calculated.

Zheng argued that since the criminal statutes that formed the basis for their conviction were passed pursuant to Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause or the Territorial Clause and neither clause applies to the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), the court lacked jurisdiction to prosecute her under those statutes.

The Court discussed the status of CNMI, specifically the Coventant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the United States of America passed in 1976 and effective in 1986. This Convenant gives the people of CNMI the right to self-governance but also enables the federal governemt to pass legislation governing CNMI as long as either the legislation can govern the states or if the legislation names CNMI.  Zheng argues that Section 501 of the Covenant lists specific provisions of the U.S. Constitution that are applicable to CNMI and that this list is exclusive. Neither the Commerce Clause nor Territorial clause are included. To support this, Zheng cites to Fleming v. Department of Public Safety, a Ninth Circuit case where the court held that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to the CNMI because it was not listed in Covenant Section 501. The Court here believed that this misreads the case and the Covenant: the Covenant listed constitutional provisions are those that would be applicable if CNMI were a state. In contrast to the Eleventh Amendment, the Commerce Clause and Territorial Clause are not provisions that apply to the states; rather, they apply to the U.S. Congress. Since Section 501 does not list any constitutional provisions regarding Congress’s authority to legislate, adopting Zheng’s interpretation of Fleming and Section 501 would eviscerate Congress’s authority to enact legislation applicable to CNMI. Thus, the Court rejected Zheng’s interpretation and held that Congress has authority to pass legislation applicable to CNMI and this authority is not limited by the enumerated provisions in Section 501.

Zheng’s sufficiency of evidence claim was rejected as well: considering the facts in light most favourable to the defendant, the court asked whether a rational jury could have convicted the defendant. In this case, the Court believes that a rational jury could have convicted Zheng of transportation of persons in execution of fraud and sex trafficking on the facts. Zheng’s other grounds to challenge her conviction, prosecutorial misconduct, evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, sentencing, were rejected by the appellate court.