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R v Sparrow

Fact Summary

Ronald Edward Sparrow, a member of the Musqueam Band, was caught fishing with a drift net 45 fathoms (82 m) in length, 20 fathoms (37 m) longer than permitted by the band's fishing licence under the Fisheries Act of 1985. Sparrow admitted to all the facts in the charge but justified it on the ground that he was exercising his Aboriginal right to fish under section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.

At trial, the judge found that section 35 protected only existing treaty rights and that there was no inherent right to fish. An appeal to the County Court was dismissed, and a further appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence to maintain the defence. He further appealed to the Supreme Court to challenge his right to fish guaranteed by the constitution.

Sentence Date:
1990-05-31

Cross-Cutting Issues

Liability

... for

• completed offence

... based on

• criminal intention

... as involves

• principal offender(s)

Procedural Information

Legal System:
Common Law
Latest Court Ruling:
Supreme Court
 
Proceeding #1:
  • Stage:
    appeal
  • Official Case Reference:
    [1990] 1 SCR 1075
  • Description

    The issue to the Supreme Court was whether the net length restriction violated s. 35(1).

    The judgment of unanimous Court held that Sparrow was exercising an "inherent" Aboriginal right that existed before the provincial legislation and that was guaranteed and protected by section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. They interpreted each of the words of section 35(1). Aboriginal rights are not extinguished merely by their being controlled in great detail by the regulations under the Fisheries Act . Nothing in that Act or its detailed regulations demonstrated a clear and plain intention to extinguish the Aboriginal right to fish. Fishing permits were simply a manner of controlling the fisheries, not of defining underlying Aboriginal right. Historical Crown policy can neither extinguish existing Aboriginal right without a clear intention nor delineate the Aboriginal right. The nature of government regulations cannot be determinative of content or scope of existing Aboriginal rights. Government policy can regulate the exercise of the Aboriginal right but such regulation must be in keeping with s. 35(1).

     

    Rule:

    “Existing Aboriginal Rights”: Term must be interpreted flexibly so as to permit their evolution over time and must reject “frozen rights” approach.

    “Recognized and Affirmed”: Framework for interpreting this term must include appreciation of history and policy between Crown and Aboriginal peoples, and be construed in a purposive way, because the purposes of s.35 demand generous and liberal interpretation.

    Section 35 Test: This is a two-part test that sets whether s. 35 rights are interfered, and if so, whether that interference is justified.

    Part One - Interference: does the impugned legislation have the effect of interfering with the existing Aboriginal right? If “yes”, then prima facie infringement of s. 35 established and the following must be asked: (i) is limitation on Aboriginal right unreasonable?, 

    The issue to the Supreme Court was whether the net length restriction violated s. 35(1).

    The judgment of unanimous Court held that Sparrow was exercising an "inherent" Aboriginal right that existed before the provincial legislation and that was guaranteed and protected by section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. They interpreted each of the words of section 35(1). Aboriginal rights are not extinguished merely by their being controlled in great detail by the regulations under the Fisheries Act . Nothing in that Act or its detailed regulations demonstrated a clear and plain intention to extinguish the Aboriginal right to fish. Fishing permits were simply a manner of controlling the fisheries, not of defining underlying Aboriginal right. Historical Crown policy can neither extinguish existing Aboriginal right without a clear intention nor delineate the Aboriginal right. The nature of government regulations cannot be determinative of content or scope of existing Aboriginal rights. Government policy can regulate the exercise of the Aboriginal right but such regulation must be in keeping with s. 35(1).

     

    Rule:

    “Existing Aboriginal Rights”: Term must be interpreted flexibly so as to permit their evolution over time and must reject “frozen rights” approach.

    “Recognized and Affirmed”: Framework for interpreting this term must include appreciation of history and policy between Crown and Aboriginal peoples, and be construed in a purposive way, because the purposes of s.35 demand generous and liberal interpretation.

    Section 35 Test: This is a two-part test that sets whether s. 35 rights are interfered, and if so, whether that interference is justified.

    Part One - Interference: does the impugned legislation have the effect of interfering with the existing Aboriginal right? If “yes”, then prima facie infringement of s. 35 established and the following must be asked: (i) is limitation on Aboriginal right unreasonable?, (ii) does the limitation impose undue hardship?, and (iii) does the limitation deny s. 35 holders preferred means of exercising Aboriginal right? The onus is on the group challenging the legislation.

    Part Two - Justification: once interference is established, then ask (i) is there a valid legislative objective? If “yes”, then (ii) does legislative objective uphold honour of Crown? The onus is on the Crown defending the impugned legislation.

    Application:

    “Sparrow Test”: Part One involves asking whether the effect of the restriction unnecessarily infringes the interests protected by the Aboriginal right, with the onus lying on the aboriginal claimant. Part Two involves the court inquiring whether the legislative objective is valid, which must be something more than a “public interest” justification because that is too vague and broad. If a valid objective is found, then is the honour of the Crown upheld? This is a key consideration whether the objective is justified. There must be a link with justification and restriction on the Aboriginal right. The justificatory standard is a heavy onus on the Crown but s. 35(1) requires that the Aboriginal right be given priority over the interests of other groups. Further questions are dependent on the circumstances of the inquiry, which may include (i) whether there has been as little infringement as possible in order to effect the desired result, (ii) whether fair compensation is available, and (iii) whether the Aboriginal group was consulted with respect to the measures being taken, however this is not an exhaustive list.

     

     

    Sentences

    Sentence

    Other Sanctions

    Conviction set aside and new trial ordered.

     

    Defendants / Respondents in the first instance

    Defendant:
    Ronald Edward Sparrow
    Gender:
    Male
    Legal Reasoning:

    The trial judge found that an aboriginal right could not be claimed unless it was supported by a special treaty and that s. 35(1)  of the Constitution Act, 1982  accordingly had no application. 

    2nd instance: The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's findings of facts were insufficient to lead to an acquittal.  Its decision was appealed and cross-appealed. 

     

    3rd instance: The governments of Canada have a fiduciary relationship with Aboriginals under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982; any denial of Aboriginal rights under section 35 must be justified, and Aboriginal rights must be given priority.

    Charges / Claims / Decisions

    Defendant:
    Ronald Edward Sparrow
    Legislation / Statute / Code:

    British Columbia Fishery (General) Regulations, SOR/84-248, ss. 4, 12, 27(1), (4).

    Charge details:

    Fishing with a drift net longer than that permitted by the terms of his Band's Indian food fishing licence. 

    Verdict:
    Guilty
    Appellate Decision:
    Remanded

    Court

    Supreme Court

    Sources / Citations

    Attachments