The Court ruled that according to the strong evidence in this case, it was proven that the minor was passed from hand to hand: from her mother to the defendant as if she was an object, and therefore the element of "a transaction in a person", as required by the offense of trafficking in persons according to Israeli law, was met. The daughter was objectified. According to the Court, the objectification, and making a use of a person, need not to be permanent and does not even require a long period of time but rather can occur for a short period of time.
Also, the transaction in a person, and the objectification of a person, do not need to involve the displacement of the victim from its place of residence, as long as they are done for one of the purposes mentioned in the offense, in this case "causing him/her to participate in an obscene publication or in an obscene performance and or subjecting him/her to a sex offense".
Additionally, the Court decided that the linkage between the money transferred to the mother by the defendant and the "usage" of the minor was proven beyond reasonable doubt, even though this is not an element of the offense that needed to be proven.
As for the consent, which is not an element of the crime as well, it was proven from the evidence that the minor protested several times, which only reinforce the element of objectification of her body by her mother and the defendant.
Finally, the Court accepted the State Attorney's Office' argument, according to which the crime of trafficking in persons involves a wide range of situations that are not necessarily contingent upon a place, consent nor a compensation, and that clearly the circumstances of the case shows that a transaction was made between the mother of the victim and the defendant, a transaction whose purpose was to make use of the minor's body as an object, both for the defendant's sexual desires and for trading in the minor's photos.