This article looks at what amounts to a timid level of Chinese migration to Russia amid the alarmist claims of Russian politicians and media since 1991 that Russia has been the target of Chinese expansion through large-scale regular and irregular migration. The article explores the reality of why a seemingly win-win migration situation did not generate more labour migration.
The research involved fieldwork in China and Russia. Literature on migration issues was collected in the Chinese city of Harbin, from libraries, universities, the provincial and the city academies of social science and government offices. Interviews were conducted at the major border crossing points of Heihe, Manzhouli, Sufinhe and Donning in the far east of China with local officials responsible for trade and commerce; businessmen engaged in trade, the recruitment of contract labour and exports of labour to Russia; and Chinese vendors in the special commercial zones. In the far east of Russia, in Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Blagoveshchensk, Ulan-Ude, Irkutsk and Birobidzhan, unstructured interviews were conducted with local officials, NGO workers involved in migration issues and Chinese nationals working in local markets, agricultural plantations and construction sites. The authors also interviewed Russian officials and researchers in Moscow, Vladivostok and Khabarovsk.
The authors conclude that despite the rhetoric of Russian political figures and media, the scale of Chinese migration to Russia has been quite modest. They argue that the failure to establish a stable community of Chinese migrants in Russia during a period when it might have been possible to develop mutual beneficial and sustainable cross-border relationships makes future large-scale migration less likely. Thus, the limited scale of Chinese labour migration to Russia represents a missed opportunity rather than a threat. The limiting factors include restrictive and shifting Russian legislation, the availability of large numbers of alternative Russian-speaking foreign workers, lagging economic development in far eastern Russia, weak cross-border economic relationships in North-East Asia and a tense atmosphere created by the exploitation of the migration issue by Russian politicians and media. Despite a shared border that stretches 4,300 kilometres and the apparent geographical ease, Chinese migrants prefer to take on the expense and risk involved in reaching destinations such as the United States or Europe, while the number of Russians working and living in China may already exceed the number of Chinese in Russia.
This article highlights the disconnect between Russian rhetoric and the reality of Chinese migration into Russia. Although it does not directly contribute knowledge on migrant smuggling, it presents a good overview of Chinese migration to Russia since 1991, with some reference to Chinese irregular migration.
