2nd Instance:

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Summary of Proceedings:

On appeal the defendants argued that the trial judge erred by:

(1) failing to provide interpretation services to appellants Wang and Chiang;

(2) inappropriately applying RPPL 7-5 retroactively;

(3) inappropriately admitting hearsay evidence against Wang at trial;

(4) finding that in the cases of appellants Wang and Manio, there was sufficient evidence produced at trial to prove all the elements of RPPL 7-5;

(5) failing to conduct a Rule 44(d) inquiry after Chiang demonstrated the existence of an actual conflict of interest held by Chiang’s counsel;

(6) finding sufficient evidence that Pamintuan was guilty of people trafficking and advancing prostitution;

(7) finding sufficient evidence to prove that the victims engaged in specific “sexual contact”, as defined by 17 PNC § 3602 (f), or sexual penetration, as defined by 17 PNC § 3602 (g); and

(8) finding sufficient evidence to prove that Manio aided and abetted the alleged crimes.

In addition, the appellants Wang, Chiang and Manio on their appeal asserted that their charging documents were insufficient.

The Court reversed the convictions of Wang and Chiang and remanded the matters for a new trial. This decision was made on the basis that their statutory and constitutional rights to understand the trial proceedings were violated during the trial.

The convictions of defendants Pamintuan and Manio were affirmed.

Detailed Analysis of Proceedings

Appellants Wang and Chiang’s primary argument was that their statutory and constitutional rights to understand the proceedings against them were violated at trial, under 18 PNC § 401 (f). They asserted that the court failed to appoint an interpreter, despite having notice of their inability to sufficiently understand the English language. No interpretation was provided during the testimony of fourteen witnesses, during the four hours of closing arguments, reading the verdict in 2007 and at sentencing in 2008. Section 401(f) requires that every defendant have the opportunity to understand the proceedings against him. Thus, the Court reversed and remanded the convictions of Wang and Chiang on a constitutional and statutory basis.

Wang, Pamintuan and Manio challenged their convictions for people trafficking, arguing that the trial court inappropriately applied the statutory retroactively. Wang and Pamintuan trafficked the victims M. and A. in December of 2004. RPPL 7-5 was not signed into law until May 2005. The victims were thus trafficked prior to RPPL 7-5 enactment. Therefore, the appellants considered the application of this legislation unconstitutional under article IV, Section 6. The Court held that the day as to when the victim was trafficked is immaterial to the crime of ‘exploitation of a trafficked person’. This was true as long as Manio knew after May 2005, the date that RPPL 7-5 was signed into law, that M. and A. were the victims of people trafficking, as defined by the State, and continued to exploit them. The Court considered Manio guilty for the crime of exploiting a trafficked person and her challenge without merit.

Wang and Chiang likewise appealed their conviction of violating 40 PNC § 1704 (False and Fraudulent  Returns), arguing that the Republic inappropriately omitted an essential element of this crime in the Information. However the court considered the charging document presented sufficient legal precision to adequately inform the defendants of the charge against them. From that document it was clear what crime they were being charged with and what acts, in what context, are alleged to constitute the crime. The defendants could clearly prepare an adequate defense based on this information. The Court denied the appellants claims for relief for the reason that the Court did not find that a reversible violation occurred.

The second argument from Manio’s appeal was that she was not sufficiently put on notice of the charge that she violated labour regulations because the relevant charging document stated that she “made” or aided and abetted the “making” of unauthorized restrictions. The specific Labour Regulation did not use the term “making” but instead used the term “imposing”. Due this error in the charging document Manio argued that her conviction of violating Labour Regulation 21.1 was improper.

On Wang’s appeal, he also argued that the trial erred when it allowed hearsay evidence to be admitted at trial. The defendant challenged the admission of numerous statements from customers of Carnival as evidence of prostitution and people trafficking. The Court asserted that the statements were arguably not hearsay; the statements were offered to show that Wang was guilty of exploiting the victims, which was an element of the crime of people trafficking. The Court found that Wang “exploited the victims by withholding their salaries through a debt system designed to force them to prostitute themselves, by withholding of their passports, and through threats of use of force”. The defendant’s claims were thus denied in this respect.

Wand and Mario challenged furthermore that there was insufficient evidence produced at trial to prove all the elements of RPPL 7-5, § § 6 and 8. They asserted that the Republic of Palau failed to show that any of the acts of people trafficking allegedly committed were done for the purpose of exploitation, they recommended  the Court look to United States cases law regarding the limitation of requiring that prostitution be the “dominant motive”. The defendants argued that the evidence at trial showed that the victims performed a significant amount of waitress-type work while they were at Carnival. They submitted that the Republic failed to demonstrate that forced prostitution was the dominant motive or purpose when they were originally recruited to work at Carnival.

The Republic stated that, according to recent case law, prostitution need only be one of the dominant motives. Further, it was submitted that because the People Trafficking Act was based on the UN Protocol and not United States Law, it would be inappropriate for the Court to read certain limitations in to People Trafficking Act that were not intended. The Court considered the defendant’s arguments without merit.

The third argument of Chiang’s appeal regarded the conflict of Chiang’s attorney. Chiang argued that he was entitled to a reversal of his conviction because the trial court failed to conduct a Rule 44(d) inquiry after Chiang had demonstrated the existence of an actual conflict of interest held by Chiang’s counsel. The Court found that the Rule 44 (c) inquiry was necessary and required, but such inquiry was not effectuated by the trial court, hence the Court granted Chiang’s appeal in this respect.

The second argument of Pamintuan’s appeal concerned the sufficiency of the evidence related to people trafficking and advancing prostitution. The defendant asserted that the Republic of Palau failed to prove her accountability of the referred crimes. She argued that the communications between her and the victims were just small talks and wise advice, none of which amount to the commission of any crime. In response, the Republic asserted that there was sufficient evidence presented for the trial court to find the defendant guilty of advancing prostitution and people trafficking. The Republic noted that the testimony indicated that the defendant was entirely aware of what was happening at Carnival. The Court held that Pamintuan advanced prostitution and trafficked people by recruiting and supplying the waitresses, even after she knew that they were being coerced into prostitution.

On Manio’s appeal, she argued that there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to prove that the victims engaged in specific “sexual contact”, as defined by 17 PNC § 3602 (f), or sexual penetration as defined by 17 PNC § 3602 (g). The Republic asserted that the definition of prostitution encompassed not only engaging in sexual contact or penetration, but also agreeing to engage in or offering to engage in such acts. The Republic contended that there was sufficient evidence presented at trial to support and to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the trial court’s findings.

In addition, Manio argued that the Court of Appeal should overturn her conviction of aiding and abetting because the Republic failed to show the specific intent required of the crime. The Republic noted that the trial court found that Mario, at times, coerced the victims to engage in prostitution and withheld their passports. It asserted that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that when each new girl showed up, Manio knew that they would be forced to into prostitution. Thus, Manio was held to have failed to show that the trial court’s findings were so lacking in evidentiary support that no reasonable trier of fact could have reached the same conclusion.

The Appeal Court concluded that the statutory and constitutional rights to an interpreter enjoyed by Wang and Chiang were violated at the trial and that the trial court erred in failing to conduct a conflict of interests analysis with respect to Chiang’s counsel. Their convictions were reversed and remanded for a new trial.

The conviction of defendants Pamintuan and Manio were affirmed.