1st Instance:
Kotka District Court, 9 December 2008, guilty.

The District Court considered that the defendants had put the injured party in a position where she no longer had other options than to submit to all types of abuse. It was stated that the defendants achieved this by restricting her freedom of movement, enforcing repayment of a debt, making threats of violence, and through the use of violence. In its assessment of the means used in the case, the District Court stated:

”When threatened by violence, she [the injured party] attempted to minimise her injuries by making choices that were not based on voluntariness and free will. She dared not run away or refuse to sell sexual services. Only fear of death gave her the incentive to seek help, accompanied by a person who had intended to buy sex […]. The [defendants] were aware of her lack of options, dependent status, and vulnerable state, and they used it for their own and other persons’ financial benefit.”

Regarding the manner of committing the offence, the District Court considered that the criterion of taking control had been met, because in addition to deprivation of personal liberty, the injured party was also considered to have been subjected to the control of the persons who had deprived her of her liberty. This condition was seen as having been met, because the injured party had been deprived of her personal liberty, her property had been stolen, and she could not influence the terms and circumstances relating to the sale of her sexual services. According to the District Court, the purpose of the act met the criteria of both sexual abuse and demeaning circumstances. According to the District Court, the injured party had been, by means of deprivation of her personal liberty, the threat of violence, and violence, compelled to have sexual intercourse or to perform a sexual act, where she had to hand over all the money gained from these activities to the defendants. The District Court also found that the injured party had been put in demeaning circumstances in order to pay off a debt or in a position where the only possibility of paying the debt was through criminal means and selling sexual services. The District Court also considered that the “snitching” debt, which it compared to a drug debt, had no legal basis whatsoever. While no legal protection is afforded to a drug debt, the District Court held that the “snitching debt” was different in that the debtor had received something in return for the debt, namely the drugs. The District Court commented on the drug use of the defendants and the injured parties by stating that drug users cannot be regarded as having “rules of their own”, and they, too, have the right to live their lives with human dignity.