Base de datos de jurisprudencia

Delincuencia cibernética

Actos contra la confidencialidad, integridad y disponibilidad de ordenador, Datos y Sistemas

• Acceso ilícito a sistemas informáticos
• Acceso ilícito a datos electrónicos
• Producción/ distribución/ posesión de instrumentos de uso indebido de la informática
• Interferencia ilícita en la integridad de los datos/ de los sistemas

Actos relacionados con la informática para beneficio personal o financiera

• Fraude

Participación en un grupo delictivo organizado

Organized cybercrime case 2004

Resumen de los hechos

An organized criminal group consisting of Russian and Kazakh nationals extorted money from foreign companies between 2003 and 2004. The suspects attacked servers of the corporate victims and demanded the payment of thousands of US dollars in return for stopping attacking such servers.

The suspects infected several computers by using malware unbeknown to the computers' owners. Such malware allowed the suspects to create a network of infected computers from which they were able to launch distributed denials of service (DDoS) attacks. A DDoS attack entails the simultaneous sending of a large number of requests to a computer server. When the number of requests exceeds the server's capacity, the server stops working.

The criminal group had an organized structure. A.A.P. was in charge of handling the network of infected computers and making it available when the group wanted to launch a DDoS attack. I.V. was in charge of writing malware intended to launch DDoS attacks, with a special function that enabled the suspects to gain control over the infected computer by exploiting a weakness of Windows.

The suspects used a number of techniques to conceal their illegal activities. They used various anonymous proxy servers and virtual private network (VPN) services as well as various anonymous mail servers in order to conceal or change their real IP addresses. They also used fake names to create new email accounts.

The members of the criminal organization developed a strategy to transfer the money extorted from the companies they attacked, using existing international payment networks such as Western Union, Webmoney and Avtobank-Nikoil. To avoid disclosing their identities, the suspects requested the corporate victims to send the payments to individuals residing in the Republic of Latvia. Such individuals subsequently transferred the funds to the Russian Federation.
One of the corporate victims refused to pay and reported the facts to law enforcement. This report triggered the investigation that led to the arrest of the suspects.

Cuestiones transversales

Responsabilidad

Responsabilidad por

• Delito consumado

Base de responsabilidad

• Intención dolosa

Responsabilidad implica

• Delincuentes principales

Delincuente/Delito

Detalles

• Participa en el grupo delictivo organizado (Articulo 2(a) CTOC)
• Ocurrió a través de uno (o más) de las fronteras internacionales (transnacional)

Países interesados

Federación de Rusia

Investigación

Organismos interesados

• United Kingdom National Hi-Tech Crime Unit (NHTCU, later the Serious Organized Crime Agency — SOCA)
• United States Secret Service
• Investigative Committee of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation
• Directorate K of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation

Observaciones

The Investigative Committee of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, Directorate K of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation and officials from United Kingdom and United States law-enforcement authorities (the server used to infect the victims' computers was located in US territory) conducted an unprecedented investigation which culminated in the conviction of the blackmailers, who were residents of the Russian Federation.

 

Cooperación internacional

Países interesados

Estados Unidos de América

Reino Unido de Gran Bretaña e Irlanda del Norte

Medidas

• Joint Investigation

Resumen

In 2004, the Investigative Committee of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federationa, upon request of British authorities, launched an investigation into extortion threats by individuals residing in the Russian territory against a number of British companies.

 

Información sobre el procedimiento

Sistema jurídico:
Derecho continental
 

Acusado / Demandado de primera instancia

Acusado:
I.V.M.
Sexo:
Hombre
Acusado:
A.A.P.
Sexo:
Hombre
Acusado:
D.V.S.
Sexo:
Hombre

Cargos/Acusaciones/Decisiones

Acusado:
I.V.M.
Acusación:
Extortion
Ley:
Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (as amended by Federal Law No. 111 of 7 July 2003)Article 163, paragraph 3, subparagraphs (a) and (b)
Veredicto:
Guilty
Pena de prisión:
8 años
Multa/Pago al Estado:
Sí  100000  roubles 
Acusado:
A.A.P.
Acusación:
Extortion
Ley:
Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (as amended by Federal Law No. 162 of 8 December 2003)Article 163, paragraph 3, subparagraphs (a) and (b)
Veredicto:
Guilty
Pena de prisión:
8 años
Multa/Pago al Estado:
Sí  100000  roubles 
Acusado:
D.V.S.
Acusación:
Extortion
Ley:
Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (as amended by Federal Law No. 162 of 8 December 2003)Article 163, paragraph 3, subparagraphs (a) and (b)
Veredicto:
Guilty
Pena de prisión:
8 años
Multa/Pago al Estado:
Sí  100000  roubles 

Fuentes/Citas

UNODC