To obtain conviction, the prosecution had to establish at least the following elements:

1. The offender recruits, transports, transfers, harbours, provides, or receives a person.

There was no dispute that from July 2008 to April 2009, women were recruited and transported from different places to work as cybersex performers.

Romero and Baylon argued that the women who worked as cybersex performers were recruited but they were not transported or transferred. The victims were given tickets, and it was their choice set their foot on the plane. The court stated that a limited meaning of the word “transport” could defeat the purpose of the law. While the victims travelled to Cagayan de Oro City, they did so because they were lured by the job and the salary offered to them when they were recruited. They departed from their places of abode with plane tickets provided by their recruiter. They, therefore, in essence, were transported from their places of abode to the place were they were to perform for the cybersex operations.

Romero and Baylon also claimed that they did not participate in the recruitment of the victims. Court stated that while this may be true, their alleged non-participation in the active recruitment of the cybersex performers could not exonerate them from criminal liability.

The accused also claimed that the victims were never harboured. These assertions, however, found no support from the evidence on record. Court also noted that trafficking in persons involved the acts of recruiting, transporting, transferring or harbouring, or receiving of persons. All these acts need not be attendant for trafficking in persons to be committed for they are independent of one another and these acts may be committed by an individual or by a group of conspirators.

2. The act/s is done by means of threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person.

The defence argued that the victims knew what they were getting themselves into and the consequences thereof and that they were even given time to decide to accept the job offer or not. Thus, there was no force, threat or coercion in whatever form employed by the accused. The Court emphasized that consent or knowledge on the part of the victims is immaterial. It neither exempts nor mitigates the offender’s criminal liability. The accused cannot capitalize on the fact that the victims recruited as cybersex performers freely and voluntarily worked as such. Particular attention was drawn to the term “taking advantage of the vulnerability of a person”. This makes it clear that trafficking in persons can occur even without the use of force. Many trafficked persons may have no means to refuse an offer owing to their position of vulnerability. Thus,  in essence and by the very nature of the means employed, there can be no free and voluntary consent of the trafficked person. The victims in the present case were in dire need of jobs. They were all lured to the offer of a salary of Php 15.000 per month. They admittedly needed to support loved ones left in their respective places of abode.

3. The person is intended to be used for prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labour, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage.

The Court stated that there was no question that the cybersex performers were sexually exploited and made to engage in pornography. The defence claimed that the women were considered as webcam or cybersex performers and that until that day, cybersex was still not punishable by law. The Court agreed that there was no specific crime denominated as cybersex, however, this did not exculpate the accused from the crime charged. The Court emphasized that al the accused were charged with trafficking in persons and not cybersex per se. Cybersex is a form of pornography and served as the purpose for which the cybersex performers were recruited, transported to, and harboured in.

Conspiracy

The Court stated that section 6 (c) of the law was obviously proven considering that there were more than three conspirators and more than three victims involved. All the accused acted in concert to achieve the same objective

Legality of the arrest

Solemo and Sederholm claimed that they must be acquitted because they were arrested without warrant and the factual milieu obtaining tin the case does not call for a valid warrantless arrest. The Court was not oblivious that the accused did reserve their right to question the validity of their arrest. However, they never included their alleged illegal arrest as a ground in their motion to quash which was denied by the court. Additionally, neither of them was presented in court to substantiate their claim of illegal arrest. Absent their testimony, the presumption that their arrest was effected in accordance with law stands.

Ibidem Defendant 1

To obtain conviction, the prosecution had to establish at least the following elements:

1. The offender recruits, transports, transfers, harbours, provides, or receives a person.

There was no dispute that from July 2008 to April 2009, women were recruited and transported from different places to work as cybersex performers.

Romero and Baylon argued that the women who worked as cybersex performers were recruited but they were not transported or transferred. The victims were given tickets, and it was their choice set their foot on the plane. The court stated that a limited meaning of the word “transport” could defeat the purpose of the law. While the victims travelled to Cagayan de Oro City, they did so because they were lured by the job and the salary offered to them when they were recruited. They departed from their places of abode with plane tickets provided by their recruiter. They, therefore, in essence, were transported from their places of abode to the place were they were to perform for the cybersex operations.

Romero and Baylon also claimed that they did not participate in the recruitment of the victims. Court stated that while this may be true, their alleged non-participation in the active recruitment of the cybersex performers could not exonerate them from criminal liability.

The accused also claimed that the victims were never harboured. These assertions, however, found no support from the evidence on record. Court also noted that trafficking in persons involved the acts of recruiting, transporting, transferring or harbouring, or receiving of persons. All these acts need not be attendant for trafficking in persons to be committed for they are independent of one another and these acts may be committed by an individual or by a group of conspirators.

2. The act/s is done by means of threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person.

The defence argued that the victims knew what they were getting themselves into and the consequences thereof and that they were even given time to decide to accept the job offer or not. Thus, there was no force, threat or coercion in whatever form employed by the accused. The Court emphasized that consent or knowledge on the part of the victims is immaterial. It neither exempts nor mitigates the offender’s criminal liability. The accused cannot capitalize on the fact that the victims recruited as cybersex performers freely and voluntarily worked as such. Particular attention was drawn to the term “taking advantage of the vulnerability of a person”. This makes it clear that trafficking in persons can occur even without the use of force. Many trafficked persons may have no means to refuse an offer owing to their position of vulnerability. Thus,  in essence and by the very nature of the means employed, there can be no free and voluntary consent of the trafficked person. The victims in the present case were in dire need of jobs. They were all lured to the offer of a salary of Php 15.000 per month. They admittedly needed to support loved ones left in their respective places of abode.

3. The person is intended to be used for prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labour, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage.

The Court stated that there was no question that the cybersex performers were sexually exploited and made to engage in pornography. The defence claimed that the women were considered as webcam or cybersex performers and that until that day, cybersex was still not punishable by law. The Court agreed that there was no specific crime denominated as cybersex, however, this did not exculpate the accused from the crime charged. The Court emphasized that al the accused were charged with trafficking in persons and not cybersex per se. Cybersex is a form of pornography and served as the purpose for which the cybersex performers were recruited, transported to, and harboured in.

Conspiracy

The Court stated that section 6 (c) of the law was obviously proven considering that there were more than three conspirators and more than three victims involved. All the accused acted in concert to achieve the same objective

The court stated that as conspiracy had been established, equal punishment must normally visit on all the conspirators as they all contributed to the success of the common design. The level of contribution is not relevant in this case.  The Court stated People v. Niera, in which this doctrine was relaxed in favour of the two accused who, although adjudged as co-conspirators, were nonetheless held to be accomplices only and so entitled to a lesser penalty than that imposed on the other defendants. The Court in the present case reach the conclusion that Romero, Baylon and Rangaig should be held guilty as accomplices since their participation was not absolutely indispensable to the consummation of the crime charged.

Legality of the arrest

Solemo and Sederholm claimed that they must be acquitted because they were arrested without warrant and the factual milieu obtaining tin the case does not call for a valid warrantless arrest. The Court was not oblivious that the accused did reserve their right to question the validity of their arrest. However, they never included their alleged illegal arrest as a ground in their motion to quash which was denied by the court. Additionally, neither of them was presented in court to substantiate their claim of illegal arrest. Absent their testimony, the presumption that their arrest was effected in accordance with law stands.

Ibidem Defendant 3

Ibidem Defendant 3