Base de données sur les stratégies

Terrorisme

Infractions

• Infractions liées aux attentats terroristes à l'explosif
• Infractions liées au transport terrestre
• Infractions liées aux infrastructures critiques

Actes Concernés

• Association de malfaiteurs

Mots Clés

• Sûreté / Contre-mesures
• Combattants terroristes étrangers (CTE) /Retour / Réinstallation des CTE
• Bombe / Engins explosifs improvisés (EEI) / Explosifs

Australia’s Strategy for Protecting Crowded Places from Terrorism

  Australie

Introduction

Crowded places such as stadiums, shopping centres, pedestrian malls, and major events will continue to be attractive targets for terrorists. The current National Terrorism Threat Level in Australia is PROBABLE (Figure 1), as outlined on www.nationalsecurity.gov.au.

This reflects the advice of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) that individuals and groups continue to possess the intent and capability to conduct a terrorist attack in Australia. The elevated terrorist threat is likely to persist for the foreseeable future and it is not confined to any one city or metropolitan area.

Attacks on crowded places overseas, including London Bridge and Borough Market in June 2017, Manchester Arena in May 2017, the Berlin Christmas market in December 2016, and the Bastille Day parade in Nice in July 2016, demonstrate how basic weapons— including vehicles, knives, and firearms—can be used by terrorists to devastating effect.

Australia is not immune. Terrorists have plotted similar attacks here, including on crowded places, and we expect more will occur.

In July 2017, police and intelligence officials disrupted a plot to conduct a terrorist attack using an improvised explosive device against the aviation sector, and a plot to develop an improvised chemical dispersion device for use in a terrorist attack on Australian soil.

Australian governments work with the private sector to protect crowded places. Our law enforcement and intelligence agencies are well-equipped to detect and disrupt plots, and they have a strong history of stopping terrorist attacks.

But the reality is it will not always be possible to prevent all terrorist attacks from occurring, so we need to strengthen our national arrangements in order to help owners and operators better protect crowded places from terrorism.

Owners and operators of crowded places have the primary responsibility for protecting their sites, including a duty of care to take steps to protect people that work, use, or visit their site from a range of foreseeable threats, including terrorism.

The objective of this Strategy is to protect the lives of people working in, using, and visiting crowded places by making these places more resilient (Figure 2). The approach taken to protect crowded places should be nationally consistent, proportionate and, to every extent possible, preserve the public’s use and enjoyment of these places. It is not possible to protect everything, so owners and operators must prioritise the highest risk areas of a crowded place.

This Strategy also ensures there is a clear and consistent understanding of what constitutes a crowded place, the roles and responsibilities of all those involved in protecting these places, and the threat environment in which they operate.

The success of this Strategy rests on strong and sustainable partnerships across Australia between governments and the private sector to better protect crowded places. To this end, the Strategy sets out a new national framework, known as the ‘Crowded Places Partnership.’ This Partnership provides a consistent approach in each state and territory for trusted engagement between all levels of government, state and territory police, and owners and operators across the country.

Identificateur de stratégies

AUS0011s

Date d’entrée en vigueur

2017-01-01

Questions transversales

Prévention

• Mesures législatives
• Facteurs de risque
• Stratégies et politiques de prévention de la criminalité
• Capacité de résistance à la criminalité
• Facteurs de risque
• Audits locaux de sécurité
• Politiques
• Institutions
• Rôle de la société civile et du secteur privé

Pièces jointes/annexes